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I. INTRODUCTION

When aparty is oncefound to befabricating,orsuppressing,
documents, the natural,indeed, the inevitable, conclusion is
that he has something to conceal, and is conscious of guilt.'
-Judge Learned Hand, 1939
The American judicial system is designed to achieve justice, which
can only result from fair trials.2 In order to achieve this goal, courts strive
to ensure that at trial, factfinders will be presented with relevant and
trustworthy evidence.3 After all, at the heart of any court action is the oral
and physical evidence which the parties produce at trial to establish their
claims and defenses. Because relevant evidence is so crucial to enabling
just verdicts, our judicial system has continually found ways to encourage
people to safeguard and preserve any potentially relevant evidence.4
Unfortunately, sometimes relevant evidence cannot be presented at
trial because it has been negligently or intentionally lost or destroyed
before the trial ever began. This is known as the spoliation' of evidence,
and it poses a serious threat to the integrity of ourjudicial system.6 Without
essential evidence, factfinders in a case cannot make an informed decision
1. Warner Barnes & Co. v. Kokosai Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 102 F.2d 450,453 (2d Cir.),
modified, 103 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1939).
2. See Zafiro v. Unites States, 506 U.S. 534,540 (1993); Boldt v. Sanders, 111 N.W.2d 225,
228 (Minn. 1961) ("It is essential to the achievement ofjustice that all of the admissible evidence
be brought... for trial or settlement with full knowledge of the facts."); Lawrence B. Solum &
Stephen J. Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36

EMORY L.J. 1085, 1138 (1987) ("Destruction of evidence undermines two important goals of the
judicial system--truth and fairness.").
3. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540; see alsoTelectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D.
107, 128 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (noting that the willful and bad faith destruction of relevant documents
injured the plaintiff's "right to a full and fair adjudication of its claims on the merits"); Solum &
Marzen, supra note 2 ("[E]vidence that is intentionally destroyed ...cannot aid the finder of fact
in reconstructing the litigated event.").
4. See, e.g., Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. 966, 969 (W.D. La. 1992)
('The preservation of... [potential] evidence... presumably increase[s] the likelihood of a true
and just verdict."); Solum & Marzen, supra note 2 ("Mhe destruction of evidence.., reduces the
likelihood that the judicial process will reach accurate results.").
5. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed, 1990) (defining "spoliation" as "[tihe
intentional destruction of evidence"). The legal concept of "spoliation" derives from the Latin
phrase contra spolatorem omniapraesumuntur,or "all things presumed against the destroyer."
Maria A. Losavio, Synthesis of Louisiana Law on Spoliation of Evidence-Comparedto the Rest
of the Country, Did We Handle It Correctly?, 58 LA. L. REV. 837, 848 (1998).
6. See Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to SpoliateEvidence in Civil Litigation:The Needfor
Vigorous JudicialAction, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 793 (1991) ("Spoliation is ...a growing

litigation practice which threatens to undermine the integrity of [the] civil trial process.").
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because they lack the requisite evidence on which to base their findings.
Thus, for centuries, courts have reprimanded parties who have engaged in
the spoliation of evidence.7 While the destruction of evidence in a criminal
trial may violate a defendant's constitutional rights,8 this Note discusses
only the destruction of evidence in a pending or potential civil action.
Traditionally, courts have relied on adverse inferences and
presumptions to deter a party from destroying evidence.9 Perhaps the
earliest recorded decision to recognize and reprimand the spoliation of
evidence was the eighteenth century decision in Armory v. Delamirie.'0 In
that case, a chimney sweeper's boy found a ring and asked a jeweler to
appraise its value. 1 The jeweler then removed the stones from the ring and
refused to return them to the boy. 2 When the boy sued and the jeweler
refused to produce the stones at trial, claiming that he had lost them, the
court ordered that unless the stones were produced, the jury could infer that
they were of the finest quality.' 3 This practice of allowing an adverse

7. While the first recorded sanction for the spoliation of evidence was in the 1722 case
Armoryv. Delamirie,infranotes 10-13 and accompanying text, courts today continue to implement
a variety of sanctions against those who destroy evidence to be used at trial. See Nesson, supra note
6, at 794.
8. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that all criminal defendants
have the right to a fair trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. See, e.g., National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639,642
(1976); Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1984). Specifically, Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.380(b), which closely follows Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, sets
forth a non-exhaustive list of judicial sanctions for discovery violations. See Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.380(b). That rule provides, in relevant part:
If a party... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery... the court
in which the action is pending may make any of the following orders:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the questions were asked
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party
obtaining the order.
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party
from introducing designated matters in evidence.
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts of them or staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part of it, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b).
10. 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722).
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. ('[U]nless the defendant did produce the jewel, and shew [sic] it not to be of the
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inference for nondisclosed evidence is still commonly used today. 4
However, today there are several other means for ensuring that
evidence is accurately produced at trial. For instance, bar associations
impose professional ethics rules which prohibit lawyers from engaging in5
or allowing the destruction or alteration of potentially relevant evidence.'
Also, some states have passed legislation which makes it a crime to destroy
evidence. 6 Additionally, most jurisdictions' rules of civil procedure
provide for court sanctions ranging from adverse inferences to outright7
dismissal or default when a party fails to comply with a discovery order.'
Most recently, a limited number of states have begun to recognize a new,
independent tort for the spoliation of evidence in a civil trial.'
In Part I below, this Note tracks the origins of the independent tort for
the spoliation of evidence. Part III traces the evolution of the independent
tort throughout various states and discusses the specific development of the
tort in Florida. Part IV analyzes the various reasons why a court should or
should not adopt an independent spoliation tort. Finally, recommendations
in Part V call for Florida courts to scale back the scope of the spoliation
tort as currently recognized in Florida's district courts of appeal.

finest water, they should presume the strongest against him and make the value of the best jewels
the measure of their damages ....).
14. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596, 599-601 (Fla. 1987) (holding
that missing medical records in a medical malpractice action created a rebuttable presumption of
negligence).
15. See, e.g., The Florida Bar v. Hmielewski, 702 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1997) (suspending an
attorney for three years from the Florida Bar for concealing his client's theft of hospital records in
an action against the hospital for wrongful death and medical malpractice). See generally MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 3.3(a) (1998) [hereinafter MRPC] (recognizing that a
lawyer has a duty of candor to the tribunal and may not offer false evidence before the court);
MRPC Rule 3.4 (1998) (providing that a lawyer shall not "alter, destroy or conceal a document or
other material having potential evidentiary value" or "falsify evidence" or assist another person in
so doing); MRPC Rule 8.4(d) (1998) (providing that it is professional misconduct to "engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice"). The relevant rules regulating the
Florida bar parallel the Model Rules. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR, Rule 4-3.3(a),
Rule 4-3.4, Rule 4-8.4 (1998).
16. See, e.g., CAL PENALCODE § 135 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.63 subd. 1(7)
(West 1998). In addition, some jurisdictions have criminal statutes which prohibit the general
obstruction of justice, but are not limited exclusively to the destruction of evidence. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 1505 (1998).
17. See Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944,946 (Fla. 1984); Sponco Mfg., Inc. v. Alcover, 656
So. 2d 629,630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (holding that a default judgment against a civil defendant who
intentionally destroyed evidence essential to the plaintiff's case was appropriate); supra note 9.
18. See, e.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986); Smith v.
Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984), overruled by Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v.
Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA
1984).
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II. COMMON LAw ORIGINS
In Smith v. Superior Court,19 the California Court of Appeal for the
Second District became the first court to adopt an independent tort for the
spoliation of evidence. In that case the plaintiff was injured when a wheel
and tire detached from an oncoming van and struck her car.2' After the
accident, the van was towed to the dealership that had originally installed
the customized wheels. 21 At the request of the plaintiff's attorney, the
dealership agreed to maintain certain parts of the van.22
Despite its promise, the dealership lost or destroyed the evidence,
making it impossible for the plaintiff's experts to inspect and determine the
exact cause of the accident. 23 The plaintiff then included a charge against
the dealership for 'Tortious Interference with Prospective Civil Action by
' The defendant immediately filed a motion to
Spoliation of Evidence."24
dismiss the charge for failure to state a cause of action.' s The trial court
agreed and sustained a demurer as to the count for spoliation of evidence.26
At issue on appeal was whether the court should recognize a new tort
for the intentional spoliation of evidence by a party to the underlying civil
litigation.27 In its analysis of this issue, the court focused on the evolving
nature of tort law.28 It recognized that "[n]ew and nameless torts are being
recognized constantly[, as] ... the law of torts is anything but static. ' 29 The

court also looked to a California Supreme Court decision issued just one
year before,30 which indicated that a negligence cause of action might be
established if the spoliator were under a duty to preserve the evidence.31
Finally, the court recognized that "[t]he common thread woven into all

19. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984), overruledby Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior
Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
20. See id. at 831. The impact of the wheel on the plaintiff's windshield caused glass
fragments to blind the plaintiff. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 832.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. Id. (quotingWLUAML.PROSSER, HANDBOOKoFTHELAwOFTORTS § I (4thed. 1971)).
30. In Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137, 138 (Cal. 1983) (en banc), police investigating a
vehicular accident failed to collect or preserve evidence. One of the drivers later sued the police,
claiming that their negligence in failing to collect evidence prevented her from bringing a civil
action against the other driver. See id. On appeal, the court stated that the police have "the right,
but not the duty, to investigate accidents." Id. at 140. Therefore, with no duty to preserve the
evidence, the court held that the police were not negligent. See id. at 143.
31. See Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
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torts is the idea of unreasonable interference with the interests of others."32
It acknowledged that the State of California already recognized an
independent tort for intentional interference with prospective business
advantage when a defendant interferes with a plaintiff's "probable
expectancies" from a business contract or profit.3 By analogizing this tort
to the facts in Smith, the court concluded that destroying evidence in a
prospective civil action, which prejudices a plaintiff's case, constitutes an
interference with a plaintiff's "probable expectancies" in a civil action.3
Before adopting a new tort for the spoliation of evidence, the court
analyzed the negative effects that might result. First, the court recognized
that an independent tort for the spoliation of evidence could provide a
means for collateral attack on an already adjudicated matter, which would
violate principles of res judicata and prevent the end to a civil litigation.35
However, the court found that because the underlying civil action had not
yet gone to trial, allowing a tort claim for the spoliation of evidence to be
included in the amended complaint would not lead to a re-trial of the same
issues.36
Second, the court recognized that an injured party cannot recover
against a perjuring witness even though perjured testimony interferes with
a party's expectancy in court.3 7 It then distinguished perjury from
spoliation of evidence by stating that perjury is a crime against the court
and is not answerable in civil actions."
Finally, the court recognized that the damages for this tort were
inherently speculative because, in order to state a claim, the relevant
evidence must be missing.39 It resolved this problem by recognizing that
it would be a greater injustice to prevent an injured party from recovering
at all than to simply reduce the certainty of damages requirement.' In the
end, the court held that under California law the plaintiff could state a
cause of action for intentional interference with prospective civil litigation
by spoliation of evidence.41
A few months later, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal

32. Id. (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (4th ed. 1971)).
33. Id. at 836 (quoting WILLAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 130 (4th
ed. 1971)) (citation omitted).
34. Id. (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 130 (4th ed.

1971)).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
(1931)).
41.

See id. at 833-34.
See id. at 834.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 835.
See id. (citing Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,563
See id. at 837.
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recognized an independent tort for the negligent spoliation of evidence in
Bondu v. Gurvich.42 In that case, the plaintiff's husband was to undergo a
triple bypass surgery at the hospital.43 While under anesthesia, the husband
suffered cardiac arrest and died.' The plaintiff then sued the hospital and
the anesthesiologist claiming, among other things, that "the hospital
intentionally interfered with [the plaintiff's] right of action in that it
'purposely and intentionally lost and/or destroyed' ... the anesthesiology

records."'45 The trial court dismissed this claim for failure to state a cause
of action.' During discovery, it was revealed that although the hospital
originally kept the anesthesia records from the event, the records could no
longer be found.47 Without this essential evidence, the plaintiff could not
establish her case and the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor
of the defendants.48
On appeal, the plaintiff sought to state a cause of action against the
hospital for its negligence in losing the anesthesiology records which were
essential to her medical malpractice claim.49 Relying on the California
decisions in Smith and Williams v. State,5" the appellate court recognized
that there can be an independent action for the spoliation of evidence, but
simultaneously recognized that an action for the negligent spoliation of
evidence could only be maintained if the defendant hospital owed a
requisite duty to the plaintiff to preserve the evidence.51 The court then
found that under Florida law, the hospital had both an administrative and
statutory duty to preserve the anesthesia records and provide them to the
plaintiff upon her request.52 With this duty established, the court held that
the plaintiff could state a cause of action against the hospital for the
negligent spoliation of evidence in a civil action.53
Less than two years later, Alaska also adopted an independent tort for
the spoliation of evidence in Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage.54 In
Hazen, the plaintiff owned a massage parlor and sued the municipality and
42. 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
43. See id. at 1309.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 1309-10.
46. See id. 1310.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983) (en bane); see supra note 30 (discussing the facts and holding
of Williams); see also supra text accompanying note 41.
51. See Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1312.
52. See id. at 1312-13. The court found that Health and Rehabilitation Services administrative
regulation 10D-28.59 and section 395.202, Florida Statutes, (1979) imposed a duty on the hospital
to maintain and furnish such records to the plaintiff upon request. See id.
53. See id. at 1313.
54. 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986).
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four police officers for various charges, including false arrest, malicious
prosecution and violation of her civil rights. Two years before this suit,
the plaintiff was the suspect of an undercover sting operation by the
Anchorage Police Department Vice Squad.56 As part of the sting, an
undercover officer wore a concealed microphone and entered the plaintiff's
parlor while the other officers recorded the events from an unmarked car
nearby. 7 When the undercover officer entered the parlor, he greeted the
plaintiff and requested the "deluxe massage,"' 8 specifically asking if sex
would be involved. 9 Although there was a later disagreement as to the
plaintiff's response, the officer proceeded to a bedroom and undressed.'
He then arrested the plaintiff when she entered the bedroom.61
Shortly after the arrest, the plaintiff s criminal attorneys met with the
prosecutor to listen to the arrest tape recorded by the officers in the
unmarked car.62 The attorneys agreed that the tape sounded "very clear and
that they heard [the plaintiff] emphatically denying that sex was
available."63 Thus, the prosecutor moved to dismiss the charges against the
plaintiff.' At the dismissal hearing, the plaintiff's attorneys requested that
the prosecutor preserve the tape or allow the plaintiff to make a copy for
a later civil suit.65 The prosecutor told the court that he would preserve the
tape. 66
Approximately two years later, just before the statute of limitations
expired, the plaintiff filed a civil action against the four officers involved
in her arrest and the municipality. 7 During discovery, the plaintiffs
attorneys requested and received the arrest tape. However, when they
listened to the tape this time, it sounded less clear and appeared to be
altered. 9 The plaintiff then amended her complaint to include a cause of
action for altering the arrest tape.70 Although the trial court issued a
directed verdict in favor of the police officers on the alteration of evidence
claims, it allowed the plaintiff to proceed against the municipality under a
55. See id. at 459.
56. See id. at 458.
57. See id.
58. Id.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 458-59.
See id. at 459.
See i.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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cause of action implied from the Alaska Constitution.7 Nevertheless, the
jury found in favor of the municipality and the plaintiff appealed.72 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the plaintiff did not need to
rely on an implied cause of action, but could have sued the municipality
directly for the independent tort of intentional spoliation of evidence in a
civil action.73
These cases marked the birth of a new family of torts. The next Part
discusses the evolution of this family of torts. Part lI.A. explains the
variations adopted by different jurisdictions. Part III.B. recounts the
development of the tort in Florida.
IH. EVOLUTION OFTHE INDEPENDENT TORT
OF SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE

Since the inception of the doctrine of independent spoliation torts,
numerous courts have encountered the issue of whether to adopt such an
independent tort. The tort has appeared in a variety of factual situations. In
some, the spoliation was due to negligence, while in others it was
intentional. In some, the spoliator was a party to the underlying civil
action, while in others the spoliator was a third party. Throughout the
years, courts have encountered all of these situations, and the outcomes
have been diverse.
A. Survey of Recent Non-FloridaCases
1. Negligent or Intentional Spoliation of Evidence
Over twenty-six jurisdictions have considered whether to adopt an
independent spoliation tort.' Of thesejurisdictions, only five have adopted
a tort for the negligent spoliation of evidence75 and only five have adopted

71. See id. at 460. In her original complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the municipality
violated her civil rights. See id. at 459. After the trial, the court ruled that the municipality could
not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it was not a "custom or policy" of the municipality to
alter evidence. Id. at 460. Before the case went to the jury, the court "created an implied cause of
action under the Alaska Constitution for deliberate violations of due process." Id.
72. See id.

73. See id.
at 463.
74. See Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950,952 n.3. (Tex. 1998).
75. See Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1998) (recognizing an
independent tort for the negligent spoliation of evidence only against a third party to the underlying
civil litigation); Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 874 (Ct. App. 1985);
Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Callahan v. Stanley Works, 703 A.2d
1014 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1997); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio
1993).
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a tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence.76 In fact, since the birth of
the independent spoliation tort, only one state's highest court (Ohio's) has
approved of both the negligent and intentional independent spoliation
torts." Still, several courts have declined to address the issue, claiming that
the case at hand lacked sufficient facts to make a decision.78
The states that have recognized an independent tort for the negligent
spoliation of evidence have virtually agreed on the essential elements of
the cause of action.79 First, there must be a pending or potential civil
litigation involving the plaintiff.80 Second, the defendant must owe a duty
to the plaintiff to preserve evidence relevant to that trial.8" Third, the
defendant must negligently destroy the evidence. 2 Fourth, the destruction
of the evidence must significantly impair the plaintiff's ability to prove the

suit.83 Finally, the plaintiff must suffer damages as a proximate result of the

76. See Hazen v. MunicipalityofAnchorage, 718 P.2d456 (Alaska 1986); Cedars-Sinai Med.
Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998); St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d
33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Levinson v. Citizens Nat'l. Bank, 644 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994);
Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615
N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993).
77. See Smith, 615 N.E.2d at 1038 (certifying that the Supreme Court of Ohio would
recognize both negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence claims). In Florida, the Third and
Fourth District Courts of Appeal have recognized the negligent and intentional spoliation of
evidence, yet the Florida Supreme Court has declined to address the issue. See infra, note 183 and
accompanying text.
78. See Peek v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 661 So. 2d 737 (Ala. 1995); Yoakum v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 416 (Idaho 1996); Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp., 556 N.E.2d 913 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990); Panich v. Iron Wood Prod. Corp., 445 N.W.2d 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Rodriguez
v. Webb, 680 A.2d 604 (N.H. 1996); Harrison v. Davis, 478 S.E.2d 104 (W. Va. 1996); Ely v. St.
Luke's Hosp., 514 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); Austin v. Consolidation Coal Co., 501
S.E.2d 161 (Va. 1998).
79. See, e.g., Holmes, 710 A.2d at 852 (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d
313, 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)); see alsoBaugher v. Gates Rubber Co., Inc., 863 S.W.2d 905, 91012 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (failing to adopt a cause of action for the negligent spoliation of evidence,
but recognizing the elements of the claim in other jurisdictions); Callahan v. Stanley Works, 703
A.2d 1014, 1017 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1997)(recognizing the elements of a spoliation of
evidence claim).
80. See cases cited supra note 79.
81. See cases cited supranote 79; see also Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d
1177, 1181 (Kan. 1987) ("It is fundamental that before there can be any recovery in tort there must
be a violation of a duty owed by one party to the person seeking recovery."). Duties include those
that arise statutorily, voluntarily, contractually, and so forth. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Delray
Beach, 652 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (providing that a duty can arise by voluntary
assumption); Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (providing that a duty
can arise contractually); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (providing that
a duty can arise statutorily and administratively).
82. See cases cited supra note 79.
83. See cases cited supra note 79.
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defendant's spoliation.'
Although Florida became the first state to adopt the negligent form of
an independent spoliation tort in Bondu,"5 most states that have considered
the issue have declined to adopt the negligent spoliation tort.8 6 The primary
reason for so holding is that the elements of a negligent spoliation of
evidence claim parallel that of a negligence claim. 7 In fact, the duty
element has often been the most pivotal for a plaintiff to establish a
claim. 8 Recognizing that a negligent spoliation claim is essentially a
disguised negligence claim, many states have concluded that the damaged
party can pursue their claim under a negligence theory, and the state need
not recognize a new tort.89
Likewise, many states have refused to adopt the intentional form of an
independent spoliation tort. 90 Most of these states have simply refused to
adopt any independent spoliation tort whatsoever. 9 In Trevino v. Ortega,92
Texas became the most recent state to outright reject an independent
spoliation tort. In Trevino, the Texas Supreme Court held that Texas law
does not recognize either the negligent or intentional spoliation of evidence
84. See cases cited supra note 79.
85. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., La Raia v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 286 (Ariz. 1986); Beers v. Bayliner Marine
Corp., 675 A.2d 829 (Conn. 1996); Gardner v. Blackston, 365 S.E.2d 545 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988);
Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. 1995); Koplin, 734 P.2d at 1177; Monsanto Co.
v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811,815 (Ky. 1997) ("We decline the invitation to create a new tort claim.");
Miller v. Montgomery County, 494 A.2d 761 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985); Federated Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Litchfield Precision Components, 456 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1990); Elias v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp.,
710 A.2d 65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
87. See Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270; Federated,456 N.W.2d at 436; Coleman v. Eddy Potash,
Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 190 (N.M. 1995); Elias,710 A.2d at 68.
88. See, e.g., Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. 966, 971 (W.D. La. 1992)
(holding that an employer did not owe a duty to preserve evidence where the employer never agreed
to preserve evidence); Koplin, 734 P.2d at 1179 (stating that "the general rule is that there is no
duty to preserve possible evidence for another party to aid that other party in some future legal
action against a third party"); Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137, 140 (Cal. 1983) (holding that police
had the right, but not the duty to collect and preserve evidence at an accident scene); Walsh v.
Caidin, 283 Cal. Rptr. 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a widow had the right to cremate her
deceased husband's body and did not owe a duty to the appellants to preserve the dead body);
Levinson v. Citizens Nat'l. Bank, 644 N.E.2d 1264,1268 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that parties
to a lawsuit do not owe each other a duty to prevent a mistrial).
89. See cases cited supra note 87.
90. See La Raia, 722 P.2d at 286; Wilson v. Beloit, Corp., 921 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1990);
Beers, 675 A.2d at 829; Gardner,365 S.E.2d at 545; Koplin, 734 P.2d at 1177; Monsanto, 950
S.W.2d at 811; Miller, 494 A.2d at 761; DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So. 2d 818
(Miss. 1992); Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1993); Weigl v. Quincy Specialties Co., 601
N.Y.S.2d 774 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545 (W.D. Okla. 1979);
Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998).
91. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
92. 969 S.W.2d 950 (rex. 1998).
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as a tort cause of action.93 The court based its decision on policy concerns,
such as "the finality of judgments, avoiding duplicative litigation, and
recognizing the difficulty in calculating damages."' It then added that it is
more logical t6 remedy the spoliation within the context of the underlying

civil action, through inferences, presumptions, and court sanctions. 95 Not
surprisingly, these were the same negative concerns that the Smith court
first recognized in 1984. 96 Although the Smith court found that the
damaged party's interest in their potential civil action outweighed these
negative factors,' Trevino shows that later courts are finding just the
opposite.
Other courts that have declined to recognize an independent spoliation
tort have relied on similar reasons. The most common reason for not
recognizing an independent spoliation tort is that there are other available
remedies to rectify the situation, such as inferences and presumptions. 98
Another popular reason is that the damages are inherently too speculative. 99

Without the evidence, it is virtually impossible to determine how much a
plaintiff might have been awarded in its underlying civil action had the
plaintiff been able to present the evidence in their civil action." ° Finally,
depending upon the circumstances, a few courts have recognized that such
a tort can interfere with a person's private property rights."0
The five states that have recognized an independent tort for the
intentional spoliation of evidence have agreed that the essential elements
of the claim parallel that of a negligent spoliation claim."° The only
93. See id. at 951.
94. Id. at 953.
95. See id.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
98. See Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829,832 (Conn. 1996); Weigl v. Quincy
Specialties Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 774,777 (App. Div. 1993).
99. See Reilly PPA v. D'Errico, 1994 WL 547671, at *6 (Conn. Super. CL Sept. 21, 1994).
But see Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 853 (D.C. 1998) (recognizing that the
Supreme Court has stated that when the tort itself precludes the ascertainment of damages, "it
would be a perversion of fundamental principles ofjustice to deny all relief to the injured person")
(quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)).
100. See, e.g., Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 518 (Cal. 1998).
101. See Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. 966, 970 (W.D. La. 1992)
(recognizing that "courts must also be concerned with interference with a person's right to dispose
of his own property as he chooses"); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1183
(Kan. 1987) (recognizing that the limitless scope of an independent spoliation tort would cause"the
unwarranted intrusion on the property rights of a person who lawfully disposes of his own
property"); Walsh v. Caidin, 283 Cal. Rptr. 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a widow had
the sole authority over the disposition of the decedents remains and did not owe a duty to the
appellants to preserve the "evidence," because "the law does not treat a human dead body as merely
another form of physical evidence").
102. CompareReilly, at *2, and Foster v. Lawrence Mem. Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 836 (D.
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difference is in the level of culpability, as the intentional tort requires that
the spoliator willfully destroyed the evidence relevant to the plaintiff's
underlying civil litigation. 3 What is most notable is that courts have held
that even the intentional spoliation tort requires that a defendant owe some
duty to a plaintiff to preserve the evidence before a defendant can be held
liable. ' 04
Interestingly, some states that have refused to adopt an independent
spoliation tort already recognize similar, independent torts. 105 For instance,
in the New York case Weigl v. Quincy Specialties Co.,' a lab technician
was injured when her lab coat caught fire."° Her employer then agreed to
preserve the coat for a later products liability action against the coat's
manufacturer."8 When it was discovered that her employer misplaced the
coat, the technician sued her employer for the spoliation of evidence." 9
The court held that the technician could not state a cause of action against
her employer for spoliation of evidence."' Although the appellate court
declined to adopt an independent spoliation tort, it recognized that the
plaintiff in the case could pursue a claim against her employer under the
independent New York tort for an employer who negligently or
intentionally impairs an employee's right to sue a third-party tortfeasor. !
2. Party or Third-Party Spoliator
Several courts that have recognized independent spoliation torts have
drawn lines around the issue of whether the spoliator was a party to the

Kan. 1992), and Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 189 (N.M. 1995), with supra notes
79-84 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Coleman, 905 P.2d at 189.
104. See Losavio, supranote 5, at 849; see also Koplin, 734 P.2d at 1181 ("It is fundamental
that before there can be any recovery in tort there must be a violation of a duty owed by one party
-to the person seeking recovery.").
105. See Weigl v. Quincy Specialties Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 774 (App. Div. 1993); see also
Jackovich v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 458, 460-66 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)
(recognizing the "tort of interference with economic relations" when an insurance adjuster lost
evidence which inhibited the plaintiffs' ability to prove that an explosion was covered by their
homeowner's insurance); Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543, 548-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991) (holding that plaintiff established a claim under New Jersey law for the "fraudulent
concealment" of evidence, which is similar to the tort for spoliation of evidence); Henry v. Deen,
310 S.E.2d 326,336 (N.C. 1984) (allowing a "civil conspiracy" claim against a party that conspired
to alter medical records in a medical malpractice claim).
106. 601 N.Y.S.2d 774 (App. Div. 1993).
107. See id. at 775.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 775-76.
110. Seeid. at775.
111. See id. at 777.
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underlying civil action. 112 Courts have recognized the detrimental impact
that the spoliation of evidence can have on an individual civil trial and the
judicial system as a whole, and have expressed an interest to deter such
egregious conduct.' Some deterrence exists without court intervention,
such as criminal statutes which penalize the destruction of evidence and
bar association rules which prevent attorneys from destroying evidence or
allowing evidence to be destroyed.' 14 Historically, though, courts have not
relied on these measures, and have taken further steps to sanction such
behavior, such as creating independent spoliation torts." 5
The first cases to recognize independent spoliation torts involved
situations where a party to the underlying civil litigation destroyed
evidence. 116 Over the years, however, numerous courts have recognized
that there is no need to adopt an independent spoliation tort against a party
to the underlying civil action because there are other court sanctions
available against the party that both deter such conduct and provide a
remedy to the injured party." 7 Depending on the spoliator's culpability and
the extent of damage caused to the plaintiff's civil action, courts may
impose a variety of sanctions to remedy the situation."' In most situations
where evidence is either missing or destroyed, courts allow the jury to

112. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511,521 n.4 (Cal. 1998) (holding
that there is no independent tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence against a party to the
underlying civil litigation in California); Holmes, 710 A.2d at 848 (recognizing an independent tort
for the negligent spoliation of evidence against only third parties to the underlying civil litigation);
see also Elias v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 67-68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (recognizing the
difference between an independent spoliation tort action against parties and non-parties to an
underlying civil litigation).
113. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643
(1976) ("[The most severe in the spectrum of sanctions... must be available... not merely to
penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who
might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.").
114. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
116. See Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986); Smith v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984), overruledby Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court,
954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
117. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998); Beers v.
BaylinerMarine Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 832 (Conn. 1996); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d
846, 848 (D.C. 1998); Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. 1997); Miller v.
Montgomery County, 494 A.2d 761,768 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985); Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d
51, 56 (Mo. 1993); Elias v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 67-68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998);
Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950,953 (Tex. 1998).
118. See Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 128 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(recognizing the willful destruction ofdocuments and the prejudice to the case in entering a default
judgment); see also Metropolitan Dade County v. Bermudez, 648 So. 2d 197, 200 (Fla. 1st DCA
1994) (considering willfulness and extent of prejudice in deciding what sanctions are appropriate
for failing to preserve evidence).
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draw adverse inferences, order a shift of presumption, or order some other
discovery sanction. 9 In the most serious and willful cases, courts can
order a dismissal or enter a default judgment."2 With such measures
available which both remedy the damaged plaintiff and punish the
wrongdoer, several courts have declined to adopt an independent tort
against a party who destroys evidence.
However, when the spoliator is not a party to the underlying civil
action, court sanctions are ineffective. Many courts have recognized that
such remedies as adverse inferences, stricken pleadings, and default
judgments neither penalize a third-party spoliator nor deter such future
conduct.121 Therefore, some courts have adopted independent spoliation
torts against third parties who destroy evidence."2 These courts have rested
their decisions on the reasons that such improper conduct must be both
penalized and deterred, and that the damaged plaintiff deserves a
remedy. 123
3. Signal of Change: Cedars-SinaiMedical
Center v. Superior Court
Perhaps the most surprising development in the evolution of the
independent spoliation torts was the California Supreme Court's 1998
opinion in Cedars-SinaiMedical Center v. SuperiorCourt. 24 In that case,
the court held that California does not recognize an independent tort for the
intentional spoliation of evidence against a party to the underlying civil

119. See Williams v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 601 A.2d 28, 33 (D.C. 1991); DeLaughter v.
Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So. 2d 818, 821 (Miss. 1992); Brown, 856 S.W.2d at 56; see also
Public Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596, 599 (Fla. 1987).
120. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643
(1976); see also Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983) (stating that a "deliberate and
contumacious disregard of the court's authority will justify [the striking of pleadings or entering
a default], as will bad faith, willful disregard or gross indifference to an order of the court, or
conduct which evinces deliberate callousness"). But see Rockwell Int'l. Corp. v. Menzies, 561 So.
2d 677, 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (finding no bad faith in the defendant's intentional destruction of
evidence, but still affirming a default judgment against the defendant).
121. See, e.g., Holmes, 710 A.2d at 849 (D.C. 1998) (stating that when the spoliator is a third
party, "an adverse inference against the spoliator would serve no purpose"); Elias,710 A.2d at 6768 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) ("[Traditional remedies would be unavailing, since the spoliator is not
a party to the underlying litigation.").
122. See Cedars-Sinai,954 P.2d at 521 n.4 (Cal. 1998) (declining to address whether the

independent tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence against a third party to the underlying
civil litigation should also be struck); Holmes, 710 A.2d at 848 (D.C. 1998); Callahan v. Stanley
Works, 703 A.2d 1014, 1017 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997) (stating that the recognition of the

tort would signal "acceptable societal behavior"); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185,189
(N.M. 1995).
123. See Holmes, 710 A.2d at 849; Coleman, 905 P.2d at 189; Elias, 710 A.2d at 67-68.
124. 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
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litigation when the party knew or should have known about the spoliated
evidence before the conclusion of the trial. '2 After almost fifteen years, the
birth state of the independent spoliation tort has scaled back the scope of
its spoliation tort.
The court began its opinion by recognizing that the destruction of
evidence "can destroy fairness and justice."'126 The court then addressed the
societal costs of recognizing an independent tort for the spoliation of
evidence, such as increased litigation costs and the possible violation of the
doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata.' 7 The court then
analogized the destruction of evidence to perjury, and stated that a party
"must be prepared to meet and expose perjury" at trial because the "trial is
1 28
his opportunity for making the truth appear.'
Next, the court recognized the various nontort remedies available to
rectify instances of spoliation.!29 First, jury instructions can allow for
inferences and presumptions.13 Second, discovery sanctions can allow a
court to assess fines, strike claims or defenses, order adverse inferences,
and even enter a dismissal or default judgment.' 3 ' Third, bar association
rules prevent attorneys from condoning the destruction of evidence by their
clients. 3 2 Finally, California penal codes make it a misdemeanor to destroy
evidence potentially relevant to a trial.'33
After recognizing that "the problem of spoliation does not appear to
be widespread," the court found that these nontort remedies provided a
sufficient deterrence to parties to the underlying litigation and the state
need not recognize an independent tort.134 The court also acknowledged
that instances of spoliation should be revealed during the discovery phase
of the underlying civil litigation.'35 Therefore, if the spoliation is
discovered before trial, the trial court should be able to appropriately
rectify the situation. 136 The court concluded its opinion by expressly stating
that it disapproved of Smith, the first case ever to recognize an independent

125. See id. at 521.
126. Id. at 515.
127. See id. at515-17.
128. Id. at 516.
129. See id. at 517.
130. See id. The court provided that the California jury instruction on the spoliation of
evidence by a party is: "If you find that a party willully suppressed evidence in order to prevent
its being presented in this trial, you may consider that fact in determining what inferences to draw
from the evidence." Id.
131. See id. at 517-18.
132. Seeid. at518.
133. See id.; see also supra note 16.
134. Cedars-Sinai,954 P.2d at 518.
135. See id. at 520.
136. See id.
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spoliation tort, to the extent that Smith allowed an intentional spoliation
tort to be claimed against a party to an underlying civil action even though
the spoliation was discovered before trial.137
B. Development of the Tort in Florida
There have only been a handful of reported decisions in Florida
regarding the independent spoliation torts. After the Third District Court
of Appeal in Bondu138 adopted an independent tort for the negligent
spoliation of evidence in 1984, the next Florida spoliation case was not
decided until six years later.
In 1990, the Third District Court of Appeal decided Miller v. Allstate
Insurance Co.'3 In that case, a design defect in the plaintiff's car caused
her to wreck.' She informed her insurance company, the defendant, that
she wanted to preserve her wrecked car in order to pursue a products
liability claim against the manufacturer."' However, the defendant
requested temporary possession of the car in order to defend a claim by
another victim of the accident. 42 The plaintiff agreed, but required that the
43
defendant promise to preserve the car for her products liability claim.
While the defendant had possession of the wrecked car, it breached the
agreement with the plaintiff and "sold the car to a salvage yard, where it
was disassembled and disposed of."' 44
The plaintiff then sued the defendant for the spoliation of evidence. 45
At issue on appeal was whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff
to preserve the evidence.' 46 The court recognized that in order to state a
claim for the negligent spoliation of evidence, the defendant must have
owed a duty to preserve the evidence. 47 The court held that the oral
agreement between the parties created a legal duty by the defendant to
preserve the evidence. 8 Thus, the contractual obligation between the
parties satisfied the duty requirement.
That same day, the Third District Court of Appeal also decided

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id. at 521 n.4.
See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
See id. at 25.
See id.
See id.
See id.at 26.
Id.
Seeid.
See id.at 27.
See id.
See id.
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Continental Insurance Co. v. Herman,149 another case involving an
independent tort claim for the negligent spoliation of evidence. In that case,
the plaintiff was injured when the vehicle she was driving was hit by an
uninsured motorist. 150 The plaintiff filed a claim with the defendant, her
insurance company, but the defendant raised the defense that the plaintiff
had been comparably negligent.'51 The plaintiff then demanded an
arbitration hearing and requested that the defendant preserve the plaintiff's
vehicle for an expert to examine.'52 The defendant agreed, but the vehicle
was subsequently "crushed and shredded."153 As a result of the arbitration
hearing, the plaintiff was awarded $860,000 in damages.5 4
The plaintiff then filed a subsequent action against her insurer for the
negligent spoliation of evidence. 5 5 At issue on appeal was whether the
plaintiff's arbitration award barred her from recovering on her spoliation
claim. 56 Before deciding this issue, the court delineated the elements of a
claim for the negligent spoliation of evidence, marking the first recorded
opinion in the country to specifically enumerate the elements. 57 The court
focused its attention on the element which requires that the destroyed
evidence must have significantly impaired the plaintiff's civil action.'58
Because the plaintiff received a significant arbitration award, the court held
that her civil action was not significantly impaired and she failed to
establish this element.'59
The Fourth District Court of Appeal first addressed the independent
tort for the negligent spoliation of evidence in Brown v. City of Delray
Beach,160 more than ten years after the Third District first recognized the
tort in Bondu. In that case, the plaintiff was severely injured while riding
his bicycle when a car crashed into him.161 Police investigating the accident
scene secured the evidence. 62 During the State's criminal prosecution of
the driver, the plaintiff requested access to the evidence but was denied

149. 576 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
150. See id. at 314.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 315.
157. See id. The elements of a negligent spoliation of evidence claim enumerated by the
Herman court are provided in the text accompanying notes 79-84.
158. See Herman, 576 So. 2d at 315.
159. See id.
160. 652 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
161. Seeid. at ll51.
162. See id.
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because of the ongoing prosecution. 163 The City, however, repeatedly
assured the plaintiff that it would preserve the evidence for the plaintiff's
later civil action against the driver." When the criminal prosecution
failed, the City delivered only an undamaged bicycle wheel to the
plaintiff.' 6
The plaintiff then sued the City for the negligent spoliation of
evidence, claiming that the City discarded most of the evidence and
presented only an undamaged bicycle wheel, not the original wheel secured
at the accident scene.' 66 The City filed for summary judgment, claiming
that it owed no duty to preserve the evidence, and even if it did, it was
protected by sovereign immunity. 6 7 On appeal of the summary judgment
hearing, the court recognized the elements of a negligent spoliation claim
as set forth in Hennan161 It then held that the City's voluntary agreement
or promise created a duty to preserve the evidence, which further
constituted an exception to its sovereign immunity. 6 9 Thus, the plaintiff
was allowed to pursue his spoliation claim against the City.170
One year later, the Fourth District Court of Appeal expressly adopted
the independent spoliation tort in St. Mary's Hospital,Inc. v. Brinson,171 a
case factually analogous to Bondu. In that case, an infant was admitted to
the defendant hospital for surgery. 72 While under general anesthesia, the
infant received an increased dose, which caused her to suffer cardiac arrest
and die ten days later. 7 The plaintiffs, the infant's parents, then sued the
hospital and the anesthesiologist for medical malpractice.74 During
discovery, the plaintiffs learned that the vaporizer used in the infant's
anesthesia had been disassembled. 75 The plaintiffs then amended their
complaint against the hospital to include a claim for the "negligent and/or
intentional destruction of the vaporizer."' 76 One issue on appeal was
whether the trial court erred in recognizing a cause of action for the
spoliation of evidence. 77 The Fourth District court embraced the tort and

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See.id at 1152.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1151-52.
Seeid. at 1152.
See id. at 1153.
See id.
See id. at 1154.
685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
See id. at 34.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id at 35.
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expressly adopted the elements of the tort as set forth in Herman.78
However, the court referred only generally to "the spoliation of evidence"
and did not specifically address whether it 179was acknowledging the
negligent or intentional spoliation of evidence.
Most recently, the Fourth District Court of Appeal again confirmed
Florida's independent spoliation tort in DiGiuliov. PrudentialProperty&
Casualty Insurance Co. 0 Although the primary issues on appeal were
irrelevant to the development of the spoliation of evidence tort, the court's
discussion of the issues was significant. 8 ' In its opinion, the court clearly
stated that "[tihe cause of action for spoliation of evidence is part of
Florida jurisprudence" and then cited to a long line of cases, all of which
have been discussed above. 2 Thus, it appears that Florida has embraced
an independent tort for the spoliation of evidence.
As of today, the Supreme Court of Florida has denied all petitions to
review the issue of whether Florida courts should recognize an independent
tort for either the negligent or intentional spoliation of evidence.8 3
Currently, the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal are the only
districts that recognize independent spoliation torts.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RECOGNITION OF INDEPENDENT
SPOLIATION TORTS

A. Arguments in Favorof Recognizing
an Independent Tort
Courts that have adopted independent spoliation torts have cited
mainly policy reasons for their decisions. The first, and most important of
these policy reasons, is that the spoliation of evidence must be stopped
because it threatens the integrity of our judicial system.'1 4 Courts have
expressed that a party to a civil action should not be allowed to reap the
benefits of willfully destroying evidence which damages their opponent's

178. See id. ("[W]e now expressly recognize a cause of action for the spoliation of evidence
and adopt the Third District's characterization of this tort's necessary elements.").
179. See id.

180. 710 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
181. See id. at 4-5.

182. Id. at 5.
183. See, e.g., Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (3d DCA 1984), rev. denied sub nom.
Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Care Ctr., Inc. v. Bondu, 484 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1986); Continental Ins. Co.
v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313 (3d DCA 1990), rev. denied, 598 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1991); Miller v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24 (3d DCA 1990), rev. denied, 581 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1991); St.
Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33 (4th DCA 1996), rev. dismissed as improvidently

granted,709 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1998).
184. See Nesson, supra note 6, at 793.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol51/iss2/5

20

Rubin: Tort Reform: A Call for Florida to Scale Back Its Independent Tor
TORT OFSPOLIATION OFEVIDENCE

case. 185 In the same sense, a third party to an underlying civil action should
not be allowed to get away with destroying evidence and obstructing
justice.
Unfortunately, the destruction of evidence can often be difficult to
detect. 8 6 Therefore, the best way to prevent such improper conduct is to
effectively deter people from destroying evidence.'87 When the spoliator
is a party to the underlying action, court sanctions such as adverse
inferences, irrebuttable presumptions, or a default judgment provide a
significant deterrence. However, when the spoliator is not a party to the
underlying action, these sanctions fail to provide an effective deterrence
88
because they cannot be used to penalize a third-party spoliator.
Therefore, without an independent spoliation tort, the only possible
deterrence to third parties comes from criminal statutes which prohibit the
destruction of evidence. Such statutes, however, are uncommon and often
only provide for a misdemeanor in the event that evidence is intentionally
destroyed. 9 Thus, there is only a mild deterrence to intentional spoliation,
and no deterrence to negligent spoliation, by third parties to a civil action.
Hence, independent spoliation torts are needed to provide the necessary
deterrence to this highly improper conduct.
Another common reason for adopting an independent spoliation tort
is that the plaintiff should be allowed a remedy, and not be forced to suffer
as a result of the spoliator's actions."' In fact, the fundamental theory
behind every tort is that "for every wrong there is a remedy."' 9' When the
spoliator is a third party to the underlying civil action, court sanctions will
not adequately remedy the injured plaintiff."9 Although the missing

185. See Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1312.
186. See Nesson, supra note 6, at 795.
187. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643
(1976); Callahan v. Stanley Works, 703 A.2d at 1014, 1017 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997).
188. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
189. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 518 (Cal. 1998)
(recognizing that California Penal Code section 135 makes it a misdemeanor to willfully destroy
evidence about to be produced at trial).
190. See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832-33 (Ct. App. 1984)
(discussing a negligence cause of action for failure to preserve evidence for a prospective civil
lawsuit), overruledbyCedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. SuperiorCourt, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998); Holmes
v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 849 (D.C. 1998); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d
185, 189 (N.M. 1995).
191. E.g., Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3523); see also supra note
32 and accompanying text. Other courts have also recognized this fundamental tort theory. See, e.g.,
Holmes, 710 A.2d at 849 ("Some remedy.., should be available to those whose expectancy of
recovery has been eliminated or severely hampered through the negligent or reckless acts of
another."); Coleman, 905 P.2d at 189 ("One who intentionally causes injury to another is subject
to liability to the other for that injury .... ") (citation omitted).
192. See supra note 121.
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evidence may warrant a simple inference or presumption, the court cannot
enter a default judgment against a defendant who did not destroy
evidence.193 There is no willfulness or bad faith on the part of a defendant
when it is a third party who destroys the evidence. Therefore, without the
possibility of a default judgment, a plaintiff will be substantially
undercompensated by any court sanction when the spoliator is a third party.
An independent spoliation tort, however, provides a plaintiff with a fair
and accurate remedy against the third party who destroyed evidence and
significantly impaired the plaintiff's case in the underlying civil action.
B. Arguments Against Recognizing an Independent Tort
Despite the policy factors in favor of recognizing independent
spoliation torts, there are even more reasons against adopting an
independent tort. Since the birth of the independent spoliation torts, courts
have essentially grouped the negative aspects of the tort into five
categories.
First, courts have recognized that other available remedies can
adequately compensate a plaintiff whose civil recovery is impaired by the
destroyed evidence. 94 Particularly when the spoliator is a party to the
underlying action, sanctions such as adverse inferences, irrebuttable
presumptions, or a default judgment provide an injured plaintiff with a
satisfactory remedy.1 95 In fact, these remedies essentially restore a plaintiff
to its rightful position, as if the evidence had never been missing or
destroyed. Additionally, evidence rules may be relaxed when documentary
evidence is destroyed in bad faith. 1" Furthermore, even in situations where

193. Compare Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983) (holding that an entry of
default is the severest of sanctions and is allowed in such extreme circumstances as when a party
willfully and in bad-faith destroys evidence), with Public Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596,
599 (Fla. 1987)(reversing a conclusive presumption of negligence and holding that only a rebuttable
presumption of negligence is created when medical records are missing as a result of a party's
negligence in a medical malpractice action).
194. See Losavio, supra note 5, at 853-54 ("Mhere there is an alternate remedy, some courts
have held that the recognition of spoliation of evidence as a separate tort is unnecessary."); Edwards
v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. 966, 971 (W.D. La. 1992); see also Reilly PPA v. D'Errico,
1994 WL 547671, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 1994); Sponco Mfg. Inc. v. Alcover, 656 So.
2d 629, 630-31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
195. See Elias v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (finding that
"traditional remedies more than adequately protect the 'non-spoiling' party when the 'spoiling'
party is a party to the underlying action") (citing Sebelin v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 705 A.2d 904
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)).
196. See FED. R. EviD. 1004(a)(1) (creating an exception to the "best evidence rule" when
evidence is lost or destroyed, unless done in bad faith by the proponent). See, e.g., Bendix Corp.
v. United States, 600 F.2d 1364, 1371-72 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (recognizing this exception to the best
evidence rule and admitting secondary evidence when the best evidence was lost or destroyed).
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the spoliator is a third party to the underlying action, a plaintiff may be able
to establish a claim against the spoliator for negligence. " Thus, there is no
need to recognize a new and separate tort in order to allow the plaintiff a
remedy.
A second common reason for not recognizing a new tort is that an
independent spoliation tort can lead to the re-litigation of already
adjudicated matters."' Not only is this inefficient, but it violates the
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel by preventing the finality
ofjudgments.199 However, this negative aspect of the tort only arises when
the spoliation tort is claimed after the underlying action has concluded, not
when the tort is claimed in the original action.""
Third, the destruction of evidence is similar to perjury or embracery,2"'
in that both undermine the integrity of a trial; yet, there are no independent
torts recognized for these crimes." Courts have consistently refused to
impose civil liability for perjury out of fear that it could "inhibit the
willingness of witnesses to give full and frank testimony in court for fear
of later being sued by the losing party. ' 20 3 This effect could clearly "render
our adversarial system impotent. 2 1 Courts have also recognized that an
independent tort for perjury or embracery would violate the doctrines of
collateral estoppel and res judicata because, by their very nature, they can
only be discovered during or after trial. 05 In contrast, the spoliation of
evidence is often revealed during discovery before trial. °
A fourth reason for not recognizing an independent spoliation tort is
that the damages element of the tort is inherently speculative because, as
a prerequisite to a claim, the evidence must not exist. 2 7 Courts have

197. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
198. See Edwards,796 F. Supp. at 971; Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d
511, 516 (Cal. 1998); Reilly, 1994 WL 547671, at *6; Murphy v. Target Prods., 580 N.E.2d 687,
690 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950,953 (Tex. 1998).
199. See supra note 198.
200. See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 833-34 (Ct. App. 1984), overruled by
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
201. See Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 953 ("Embracery is '[t]he crime of attempting to influence
ajury corruptly to one side or the other."' (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 522 (6th ed. 1990)).
202. See Cedars-Sinai,954 P.2d at 516; Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 953; see also Regal Marble,
Inc. v. Drexel Invs., Inc., 568 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) ("There is no cause of action
recognized in this state for false statements made in prior judicial proceedings."); Baugher v. Gates
Rubber Co., Inc., 863 S.W.2d 905,911-912 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
203. Regal Marble, 568 So. 2d at 1283 (finding that the appropriate remedy for perjury is a
criminal proceeding); see also Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 834 (finding that perjury is a crime against
the state, deserving of a criminal prosecution, not a civil action).
204. Regal Marble, 568 So. 2d at 1283.
205. See Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 953.
206. See Cedars-Sinai,954 P.2d at 516,520.
207. See id. at 518. ("Without knowing the content and weight of the spoliated evidence, it
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suggested that any allegation of damages is mere speculation.208 Although
this is true, it is not dispositive of the issue. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized that when the tort itself precludes the ascertainment
of damages, "it would be a perversion of fundamental principles ofjustice
to deny all relief to the injured person." 2'
Finally, some courts hay e recognized that a tort for the spoliation of
evidence, if unchecked, could seriously infringe on a person's private
property rights. 0 In an extreme situation, a person completely uninvolved
with the underlying civil action could become personally liable for simply
discarding his own property. However, the duty element of both the
negligent and intentional spoliation torts reduces this problem.2
An additional reason for not adopting an independent tort, which no
courts have specifically addressed yet, is that there are competing court
interests. For instance, under mostjurisdictions' evidentiary rules, evidence
of subsequent remedial measures is inadmissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct. 212 The stated policy reason behind this rule is that courts
do not want to punish behavior that remedies a known problem and
reduces the likelihood of further injury.21 3 Competing court interests can
be seen in a situation where a party remedies a known problem or
condition by discarding or dismantling it. According to evidentiary rules,
the subsequent remedial act may not be used to prove that the condition
was originally negligent. However, the subsequent remedial act may render
the party liable for the spoliation of evidence. This result would be contrary
to the intentions of the evidentiary rules.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is widely agreed upon that the spoliation of evidence is a serious
problem. 4 Not only does such conduct need to be deterred, but plaintiffs
whose expectancies in a civil recovery are damaged because of such

would be impossible for the jury to meaningfully assess what role the missing evidence would have
played in the determination of the underlying action.").
208. See Larison v. City of Trenton, 180 F.R.D. 261,265-66 (D.N.J. 1998) (failing to adopt
an independent spoliation tort partly because the court was unwilling "to engage in speculation and
conjecture" in regards to the damages requirement); Reilly PPA v. D'Errico, 1994 WL 547671, at
*6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 1994) (stating that "the inherently speculative nature of the
spoliation tort militates against adopting such a cause of action").
209. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
210. See supra note 101.

211. See supra text accompanying note 104.
212. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407; FLA. STAT. § 90.407 (1997).
213. See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (noting that this exclusionary rule "rests

on the social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking,
steps in furtherance of added safety").
214. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
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conduct deserve to be compensated. However, Florida's judicially created
independent spoliation tort is not always necessary to accomplish these
goals.
In recommending changes to Florida's independent spoliation tort, the
first issue to resolve is who, if anybody, should be liable for the spoliation
of evidence. Essentially, there is no need to recognize an independent
spoliation tort against a party to a civil action. Court sanctions such as
adverse inferences, presumptions, jury instructions, and even a default
judgment both adequately deter a party from destroying evidence and
remedy a plaintiff who is the victim of the spoliation.1 5 Allowing any other
remedy is useless, redundant,
and may only result in providing a windfall
216
recovery to the plaintiff.
Third-party spoliation changes this analysis drastically. From a
deterrence perspective, Florida law does not deter third-party spoliation
because a third-party spoliator is not threatened by civil or criminal
liability for such actions. Although some states have criminal statutes
which prohibit the destruction of evidence, Florida does not.2" 7 However,
such statutes appear to have little, if any, deterrent effect.218 Therefore,
Florida needs to recognize an independent spoliation tort in order to
effectively deter third parties from destroying evidence.
From a remedy perspective, court sanctions do not adequately remedy
a plaintiff whose interest in a pending or potential civil litigation is
impaired by third-party spoliation because, without the willful or bad faith
destruction of evidence by a party to the civil action, a court will not order
the ultimate sanction of a default judgment against the defendant.2 9
Therefore, the only way to appropriately remedy a damaged plaintiff is to
allow the plaintiff to recover against the third party under the tort for the
spoliation of evidence.
Once it is established that third parties should be liable for the
spoliation of evidence, the next question to answer is what level of
culpability should trigger liability under the tort. When a third party
destroys evidence, either negligently or intentionally, the plaintiff suffers
the same damage. Therefore, from a remedial approach, it scarcely makes
sense to allow recovery for one level of culpability and not the other.
A deterrence approach leads to the same conclusion. Currently in
Florida, both the negligent and intentional spoliation torts require that the
spoliator owe some duty to preserve the evidence before the spoliator will

215. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
216. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, 456 N.W.2d 434,439
(Minn. 1990).
217. See supra note 16.
218. See supra notes 16& 189.
219. See supra notes 16 & 121 and accompanying text.
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be liable under the tort for the destruction of the evidence.22 From a
deterrence point-of-view, society demands that people be deterred from
breaching their legal duties. 2 ' Whether a breach is negligent or intentional,
it should be deterred. If this were not the case, there would be no liability
for negligence. Therefore, Florida should continue to recognize the tort for
both the negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence.
The next issue is whether the tort must be brought in the underlying
civil action, or whether it can be brought in a later, separate action.
However, once the tort has been limited to third parties, the timing of when
it is brought is no longer an issue. By definition, a third party was not
involved in the underlying civil action. Therefore, no matter when the
spoliation tort is brought against a third party, it will not violate the
principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata.
The final consideration is that the scope of the independent spoliation
tort must be limited. If the scope were too broad, it might infringe on
private property rights or raise due process concerns. 22 In order to properly
tailor the scope of the tort, whether negligent or intentional, it should only
be recognized where the spoliator owed a duty to the plaintiff to preserve
the evidence. Thus, the breach of that duty is what triggers the spoliator's
liability.
For these reasons, this Note calls on Florida's courts to scale back the
tort as currently recognized in the Third and Fourth Districts. While the
scope of Florida's tort should continue to extend to both the negligent and
intentional spoliation of evidence,'it should only be recognized against
third parties to an underlying civil action who violated a duty to preserve
the evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION

In essence, as courts and commentators alike have stated, the
spoliation of evidence threatens the integrity of our judicial system.
Because there can be no truth, fairness, or justice in a civil action when
relevant evidence is destroyed before trial, courts need to deter both the
negligent and intentional destruction of evidence. When a party relies on
certain evidence to present its claim, and then fails to do so because of
another person's willful destruction of that evidence, the injured party
deserves a remedy. While court sanctions have been imposed for centuries
220. See Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 1312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); St. Mary's Hosp.,
Inc. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33, 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
221. See supra note 81.
222. The case of Public Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987) illustrates these
concerns. In Valcin, the Supreme Court of Florida struck down a court's conclusive presumption
of liability when medical records were lost in a medical malpractice action because a conclusive
presumption of liability violated the defendant's due process rights. See id. at 599.
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against parties to a civil action who destroy evidence, such sanctions are
simply ineffective against third parties. Recognizing this, numerous states,
including Florida, began to adopt new spoliation torts. However, the tort
currently recognized by the Florida District Courts of Appeal is excessive
in that it extends liability to parties of an underlying civil action that
destroy evidence. Therefore, Florida courts need to scale back the
independent spoliation tort to only allow liability for third parties to an
underlying civil action who destroy evidence.
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